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[45 C.2d 623; 290 P.2d 257]

[L. A. No. 23765.

In Bank.

Nov. 29, 1955.]

TREASURE ALICE ARENS; as Administratrix, etc., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; MAUDE H. McLAREN,
Real Party in Interest.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Probate Homesteads-Appeal.-An order
setting aside a probate homestead is appealable and becomes
final when the time for appeal expires (Prob. Code, § 1240)
whether or not it is in excess of the court's jurisdiction.
[2] Id.-Probate Homesteads-Oertiorari.-Certiorari does not lie
to review an order setting aside a probate homestead, since the
writ can issue only when there is no appeal. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1068.)
[3] Id. - Probate Homesteads - Oertiorari-Although an order
denying a motion to vacate a prior order setting aside a probate homestead is not appealable, review of that order would
require a review of the order to be vacated, and the appealability of the latter prevents a review thereof by certiorari.
[4] Id.-Probate Homesteads-Oertiorari.-The mere fact that
decedent's daughter received no notice of a petition filed on
behalf of the widow praying that a probate homestead be set
aside to her or of the court's order did not preclude the daughter from appealing, so as to make certiorari an available
remedy, since Prob. Code § 1200, prescribing the form of
notice to be given on a petition to set apart a probate homestead, does not require actual notice, and a compliance with its
terms makes the order conclusive on all persons.

PROCEEDING in certiorari to review an order of the
Superior Court of San Bernardino County denying a motion
to vacate an order setting apart a probate homestead. Proceeding dismissed.
Krag & Sweet and Donald R. Krag for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Lonergan & Jordan and A. M. Sessions for Real Party in
Interest.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 86 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 428; [2-4] Decedents' Estates, § 428.1.
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TRA YNOR, J .-On :March 7, 1951, approximately 19 years
after the <.leath of Chauncey L. Hartman, a verified petition
was filed in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County
Oll behalf of his widow, Nellie May Hartman, by her sonin-law, Charles R. McLaren, alleging that the decedent had
an undivided two-thirds interest in certain real property
of the value of $4,075 and that the widow had an undivided
one-third interest therein. The petition prayed that the real
property be set apart to the widow "for her lifetime, as a
probate homestea<.l, and for such other relief as may be proper
in the premises."
On April 18, 1951. the court entered the following order: .
"The verified petition of CHAS. R. McLAREN for an order
setting apart a homestead under the provisions of Sections
660 and 661 of the Probate Code, heretofore filed in this
Court, came on regularly to be heard this 23rd day of March,
1951; it appears to the satisfaction of the Court, and the
Court finds, that notice of the hearing on said petition has
been regularly given in accordance with the provisions of
Section 1200 of the Probate Code; and the Court having
heard the evidence, it appearing therefrom that the allegations in the petition are true and that at the time of decedent's
death, Nellie May Hartman, the surviving widow, was a
member of decedent's family, and it having been duly made
to appear to the Court that no homestead had been selected
during the lifetime of the decedent, and it further appearing
the property hereinafter described was owned, as to an undivided one-third interest, by Nellie May Hartman, the surviving widow of decedent, as her separate property, and as
to the remaining two-thirds interest by decedent, as his separate property, and that said real property should be set aside
to the surviving widow.
"IT Is HEREBY ORDERED that the land described as follows,
to wit: [description omitted] . . . be and the same is hereby
set apart to NELLIE MAY HARTMAN, the widow of decedent,
as a homestead for the use of Nellie May Hartman, and that
said real property so set aside shall vest absolutely in and
belong to her."
On February 3, 1952, Nellie May Hartman died leaving
a will in which she sought to devise the real property to her
daughter, Maude H. McLaren. On September 7, 1954, petitioner herein, rrreasure Alice Arens, the daughter of decedent Chauncey L. Hartman, noticed a motion to vacate
the order of April 18, 1951, setting apart the probate home-
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stead absolutely to Nellie May Hartman, on the grounds that
the relief granted was in excess of that prayed for (see
Burtnett v. King, 33 Ca1.2d 805 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.2d
333]) and that under Probate Code, section 661, the court
acted in excess of its jurisdiction in setting apart the probate
homestead to Nellie May Hartman absolutely instead of for
life. After a hearing the court on September 23, 1954, denied
the motion on the grounds that "it appears from the record
that since no requests for notice were filed, the notice as
given was legally adequate" and that "petitioners' remedy
was a timely appeal from the Order made." Petitioner seeks
a writ of certiorari to review the order denying the motion
to vacate the order setting apart the probate homestead.
[1] The order setting aside the probate homestead was an
appealable order and became final when the time for appeal
expired (Prob. Code, § 1240) whether or not it was in excess
of the jurisdiction of the court. (Phelan v. Superior Court,
35 Cal.2d 363, 366 [217 P .2d 951].) [2] Certiorari does not
lie to review that order, for the writ can issue only when
"there is no appeal." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068.) [3] Nor
can this rule be avoided by means of a motion to vacate
the order. Although the order denying the motion to
vacate is not appealable (Kramer v. Superior Court, 36 Ca1.2d
159, 161 [222 P.2d 874]), review of that order would require
a review of the order to be vacated, and the appealability of
the latter prevents a review thereof by certiorari.
[4] Petitioner contends, however, that she could not appeal
from the order setting apart the probate homestead because
she received no notice of the petition filed by Charles R.
McLaren or of the order made pursuant thereto, and that
therefore certiorari is an available remedy. (See Grinbaum
v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 528, 556 [221 P. 635].) It is
immaterial that petitioner received no actual notice of the
petition or of the court's order. Section 1200 of the Probate
Code, which prescribes the form of notice to be given upon
a petition to set apart a probate homestead, does not require
actual notice. It provides, however, for special notice to
be given to persons requesting it at their post office address
given in the request for special notice. Petitioner made no
such request. Section 1200 also provides: ' 'Proof of the
giving of notice must be made at the hearing; and'if it
appears to the satisfaction of the court that said notice has
been regularly given, the court shall so find in its order,
and such order, when it becomes fina] , shall be conclusive

)
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on all persons." Since the order of April 18, 1951, quoted
above, shows that the foregoing conditions were met, the
order is "conclusive on all persons." Since no such statutory
provision was involved in Grinbau,m v. Superior Oourt, supra,
and since the record therein affirmatively showed that the re·
quired notice was not given, an exception to the rule prescribed by section 1068 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot
be made under the authority of that case.
Since it is clear that certiorari does not lie, we do not
reach the question whether or not the order of April 18, 1951,
was in excess of the court's jurisdiction.
The proceeding is dismissed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence,
J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. In my opinion the trial court
was without power to grant relief which exceeded that authorized by statute (Prob. Code, § 661), requested in the
petition for order to set apart probate homestead, and designated in the notice of hearing on the petition as the relief
sought. Furthermore, it is my opinion that the writ of certiorari should be available to Treasure Alice Arens for the
reason that she lost her right to appeal from the order
setting aside the homestead without fault on her part because
she had no actual notice of the making of such order, and
even if she had received actual notice she would have had
no reason to anticipate that she should appear to oppose the
granting of relief in excess of that prayed for and statutorily
authorized.
The real property in question was acquired by decedent
Chauncey L. Hartman by purchase prior to his marriage to
Nellie May Hartman; from this it would appear to have been
wholly his separate property. However, the order which purports to set it aside absolutely to Nellie May Hartman
states that it appears that such property "was owned, as
to an undivided one-third interest, by Nellie May Hartman,
the surviving widow of decedent, as her separate property.
and as to the remaining two-thirds interest by decedent, as
his separate property." This language substantially follows
language of the petition for an order to set apart a home.
stead. It is apparently based upon a will of decedent which
was filed with a petition for letters of administration but
was not pl'obated because proof of the signatures of the sub-

)
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scribing witnesses could not be obtained. The will stated that
Chauncey L. Hartman and Nellie May Hartman had mutually
agreed that he owned a two-thirds interest in the realty as his
separate property and she owned a one-third interest as her
separate property; it purported to devise decedent's twothirds interest to Nellie May for life with remainder to decedent's two children, Treasure Alice and Donald.
The petition for order setting apart a probate homestead
prays that the order set apart the property to Nellie May
Hartman "for her lifetime." In the notice of hearing the
relief prayed for is not stated but the "petition is hereby
referred to for further particulars." The order finds "that
notice of the hearing on said petition has been regularly
given" (italics added). Yet the superior court proceeded to
order that the real property "shall vest absolutely in and
belong to" Nellie May Hartman.
Whether the decedent owned the entire fee in the real
property or a two-thirds interest as his separate property,
the probate court was authorized by statute to set it aside
only for a limited period not exceeding the lifetime of the
widow. Section 661 of the Probate Code provides, in material part, that the court must select a homestead "out of
the community property or out of real property owned in
common by the decedent and the person or persons entitled
to have the homestead set apart, or if there be no community
property and no such property owned in common, then out
of the separate property of the decedent. If the property
set apart is the separate property of the decedent, the court
can set it apart only for a limited period, to be designated
in the order, and in no case beyond the lifetime of the surviving spouse. . . ." Under this section the separate property interest of a decedent, whether it be the entire ownership
of the property or an interest in common with the survivor
entitled to the homestead, can be set apart for a limited time
only. (Estate of Maxwell (1935), 7 Cal.App.2d 641, 642 [46
P.2d777] .)
It has been stated and held that an order setting aside
absolutely a probate homestead to a widow from separate
property of the deceased husband, although erroneous, is not
void. (Estate of Bette (1915), 171 Cal. 583, 585-586 [153
P. 949] ; Estate of Huelsman (1899), 127 Cal. 275, 2~6 [59
P. 776] ; In re Moore (1892), 96 Cal. 522, 531 [31 P. 584] ;
Fergodo v. Donohue (1919), 40 Cal.App. 670, 671 (181 P.
819] ; see also Estate of Burns (1880), 54 Cal. 223, 227-228;

...
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/(ountree v. Montague (1916), 30 CaLApp. 170, 176-178 [157
P. 623].) The foregoing cases, however, did not concern all
attack by certiorari upon the order setting apart the homestead, nor did they concern the effect of an order whicn
granted relief in excess of that prayed for in the petition and
designated in the notice as the relief which would be sought.
For the purpose of determining the right to review by
certiorari, action contrary to that authorized by statute (here.
the granting of relief in excess of that authorized by Probe
Code, § 661) is action in excess of jurisdiction. (See, e.g.,
Burtnett v. King (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 805, 807 [205 P.2d 656.
12 A.L.R.2d 333]; Abellci1'a v. District Court of Appeal
(1941), 17 Ca1.2d 280, 288 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] ;
Rodman V. Superior Court (1939), 13 Ca1.2d 262, 270 [89
P.2d 109].) Furthermore, in a proceeding instituted in the
probate court by statutorily authorized posted notice, where
interested persons have no actual notice, policy should demand
that the relief granted cannot exceed that which, according
to the notice, will be sought. Such policy is analogous to that
which underlies the rule that in civil default actions a decree
which grants relief in excess of that prayed for exceeds the
court's jurisdiction and is void. (Burtnett v. King (1949),
supra, 33 Ca1.2d 805, 808.)
I agree with petitioner's contention that, despite the theoretical availability of the remedy of appeal, certiorari should
be available because without any fault on her part she had
no actual knowledge of the proceeding to set apart the homestead and therefore could not appeal. (Grinbaum V. Superior
Court (1923), 192 Cal. 528, 556 [221 P. 635] ; see also Lee
v. Small Claims Court (1939), 34 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [92 P.2d
937] ,and cases there cited [the statute which resulted in
a situation where the time for appeal from the judgment of
the small claims court might well expire without defendant
having notice of entry of judgment against him has been
since amended (Code Civ. Proc., § 117j; Am. Stats, 1951, ch.
1143, p. 2912, § 1; Stats. 1951, ch. 1737, p. 4087, § 20; Stats.
1955, ch. 566, § 1)].)
For the foregoing reasons, I would annul the order of
April 18, 1951, which sets apart the homestead absolutely.

